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Abstract
Background: Healthcare costs in most developed countries are not clearly linked to better patient and public
health outcomes, but are rather associated with service delivery orientation. In the U.S. this has resulted in large
variation in healthcare availability and use, increased cost, reduced employer participation in health insurance
programs, and reduced overall population health outcomes. Recent U.S. healthcare reform legislation addresses
only some of these issues. Other countries face similar healthcare issues.
Discussion: A major goal of healthcare is to enhance patient health outcomes. This objective is not realized in
many countries because incentives and structures are currently not aligned for maximizing population health. The
misalignment occurs because of the competing interests between “actors” in healthcare. In a simplified model
these are individuals motivated to enhance their own health; enterprises (including a mix of nonprofit, for profit
and government providers, payers, and suppliers, etc.) motivated by profit, political, organizational and other forces;
and government which often acts in the conflicting roles of a healthcare payer and provider in addition to its role
as the representative and protector of the people. An imbalance exists between the actors, due to the resources
and information control of the enterprise and government actors relative to the individual and the public. Failure
to use effective preventive interventions is perhaps the best example of the misalignment of incentives. We
consider the current Pareto efficient balance between the actors in relation to the Pareto frontier, and show that a
significant change in the healthcare market requires major changes in the utilities of the enterprise and
government actors.
Summary: A variety of actions are necessary for maximizing population health within the constraints of available
resources and the current balance between the actors. These actions include improved transparency of all aspects
of medical decision making, greater involvement of patients in shared medical decision making, greater oversight
of guideline development and coverage decisions, limitations on direct to consumer advertising, and the need for
an enhanced role of the government as the public advocate.
Background
T h ep r o d u c to ft h eh e a l t h c a r es y s t e ms h o u l db et h e
health of the population served by the system [1] even
though other objectives such as fairness, equity and
responsiveness are also important considerations in the
allocation of healthcare resources. Yet, the impact of
healthcare on health is rarely measured, discussed, or
effectively used for resource allocation. One purpose of
this paper is to argue that services and resources in
healthcare should be directed toward maximizing the
public health. We use the United States as an example
because of its extreme consumption of healthcare
resources, and because it is currently implementing a
healthcare reform. Still, many if not all of the considera-
tions herein are also applicable to other healthcare
systems.
Several major issues, which are most evident in the
United State (U.S.), must be addressed with regard to
healthcare resources and their allocation. First, health
outcomes in the U.S. are not outstanding relative to
other developed economies, even though the U.S.
healthcare expenditure per capita and as a percentage of
GDP far exceed those of any other economies [2,3].
Among G8 countries, the U.S. has higher infant
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(Figure 1). Second, the U.S. has been unable to control
healthcare costs. Although the rate of increase slowed
down in the 1990s [4], evidence suggests a new accelera-
tion in healthcare costs and that costs will continue to
increase in the future [5]. The consequences of the
inability to control costs are well known, and are among
the major drivers for the current health reform. For
example, American products do not compete well on
the international market [6], and the rate of uninsured
which appears to be linked to the costs of healthcare [7]
continues to climb. Third, the distribution of health ser-
vices and outcomes is highly variable, with wide differ-
ences in their distribution among various population
groups.
In March, 2010, U.S. President Obama signed the
“Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” (P.L.111-
148). This complex set of regulations will be phased in
over several years. The first phase began in September
2010. Insurance companies can no longer deny coverage
to children who have preexisting medical conditions and
insurance companies are required to provide coverage
on the parents policies for young adults up to age 26.
T h ef i r s tp h a s ea l s oi n c l u d e d creation of a temporary
high-risk pool for those with pre-existing conditions. By
2014 most U.S. Citizens and qualified legal residents will
be required to have health insurance. Large employers
will be required to offer health insurance, or provide
their employees with a tax credit for purchasing health
insurance. In order to give all citizens the benefits of
being under the wings of a large healthcare purchaser,
the states will create health insurance exchanges that
are accessible to individuals and small groups.
While the objective of healthcare is to produce a
healthy population, much of the current focus is on the
wrong metrics. Health outcome can be defined as a pro-
duct of life expectancy and quality of life, and there is
wide agreement that healthcare systems should maxi-
mize average healthy life expectancy [8]. But, instead of
measuring health outcomes, healthcare systems often
measure variables that may not directly affect health
outcome. Productivity has been measured by counting
units of services delivered, and quality has been defined
by number of units of service that comply with guide-
lines. As a result, many resources are used to support
services that have little impact on patient outcomes,
while other services that may have a substantial impact
on health outcomes are underutilized. The problem, we
argue, stems from the imbalance between the resources,
information, and motivation of the various healthcare
arena actors. In this paper, we highlight these differ-
ences through the presentation of a simplified model
that includes only three categories of actors: individuals,
enterprises, and government. We also suggest policies
that might provide greater balance between the actors,
and help improve population health.
The Misalignment of Incentives
Healthcare resource allocation should focus on the
objective of providing the most health, rather than the
most services, to most people. This is a society-wide
objective, and not an individual-oriented or enterprise-
oriented goal. Rather than providing the most services
to many individuals, healthcare systems should strive to
raise the health status of the population to its highest
possible level.
In the preamble to its 1946 Constitution the WHO’s
defined health as “A state of complete physical, mental
and social well-being.” The Ottawa Charter of 1986
expanded the definition to include health as a resource
for living, including social and personal activities in
addition to physical functioning. But buying health and
buying healthcare are not equivalent, and health out-
comes may not be achieved by service delivery alone.
Most developed counties face a paradox of healthcare
excess and deprivation. Some people get too much
healthcare, including expensive but unnecessary or inef-
fective tests and treatments [9], while others get too lit-
tle or insufficient care, or none at all. Experts believe
that in the U.S., which is perhaps the most extreme
example, between one-third and one-half of all of the
services purchased and delivered have no beneficial
effect on individual health outcomes [10].
Overuse of services that do not result in better patient
outcomes can occur when incentives and structures are
not aligned with achieving the objective of improved
population health. The U.S. healthcare market is an
example of a system that incentivizes use over outcome.
Overuse and misuse of services has negative conse-
quences for several reasons. First, excessive use increases
the costs of healthcare. Second, overuse of ineffective
Figure 1 Life expectancy in selected developed countries, 2005
(OEDC data, art original).
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used for purposes not directly linked to improving
health contributes to the increase in healthcare costs.
Third, certain segments of the population are offered
healthcare coverage matching their ability to pay but far
exceeding their direct needs, and the cost of the addi-
tional services further increases the costs of the health
services for the whole population.
In a kind of paradox, excess and deprivation are cau-
sally linked. Over- and inappropriate consumption cause
health services costs and insurance rates to rise, leading
to an increase in deprivation for other, and particularly
the most vulnerable, segments of the population. This is
best illustrated in an analysis of the U.S. system reported
by Gilmer and Kronick [11] who demonstrated that
between 1979 and 2002, inflation adjusted per capita
health expenditure and the percentage of workers who
are uninsured track almost perfectly. Increases in the
cost of health are very highly correlated with the per-
centage of the workforce that is uninsured. In the U.S.
healthcare system, many of the increased costs are
passed on to employers who still pay most of the health
insurance costs, as well as to public healthcare agencies
(e.g., Medicaid, Medicare) and to individual health pol-
icy holders. As costs increase, many employers decide to
discontinue coverage for their employees, and other
insureds drop their coverage. The result is an increase
in the uninsured rates, as well as an increase in the per-
centage of those electing to have minimal or insufficient
health coverage, with an overall increase in the depriva-
tion of health coverage [12,13]. Today, nearly 50 million
U.S. citizens are without health insurance [14] and
many others have minimal coverage or are only covered
for catastrophic events. In other countries with universal
coverage, excessive consumption may not influence the
number of people left out of healthcare system; still,
overconsumption strains the system, resulting in the
elimination or minimization of other services, poorer
working conditions for providers, and increased taxes.
Another link between excess and deprivation is
reflected in the development of health outcomes over
time. Excess treatments for working age individuals
indeed reduce - for those receiving these - the inci-
dences of mortality and severe morbidity [15]. The
result is an increase in the number of older living adults
who, due to their limited resources and the lack of con-
tinued health insurance from employers, are eventually
deprived of healthcare relative to their working periods,
even if they receive public medical services.
Health Outcomes and Health-Related Quality of Life
Metrics are needed to measure and assess the perfor-
mance of the healthcare system in improving the popu-
lation health. This should be done on two levels. First,
the improvement should be measurable at the level of
the individual. Second, it must conceptualize and mea-
sure health status on the larger scale of population and
society. The conceptualization and measurement of
health has been a concern of scholars for many decades
[16]. Public-health statistics concentrate on mortality
and death rates. One major health indicator is life
expectancy, defined as the expected number of years of
life for a member of the considered population. A sec-
ond major indicator is infant mortality, defined as the
number of babies born alive that die within one year of
birth, and is usually expressed per 1,000 live births.
Mortality remains the major outcome measure in most
epidemiological studies and clinical trials, and many
public-health statistics focus exclusively on mortality,
due to the ease of measurement of crude mortality
rates, age-adjusted mortality rates, and infant mortality
rates.
Obviously, any model of health outcome that excludes
mortality would be incomplete. However, many signifi-
cant health conditions are not well reflected by mortality
information, even though they affect function and qual-
ity of life. For example, osteoarthritis, cataracts, and
minor depression may all cause poor health with little
or no effect on life expectancy or infant mortality
statistics.
The measurement of health must consider not only a
person’s current ability to function, but also the prob-
ability of future changes in function, in addition to the
probability of death. The spectrum of medical care
ranges from public health, preventive medicine, and
environmental control, to diagnosis, therapeutic inter-
vention, convalescence, and rehabilitation. Many of
these affect the probability of future dysfunction,
rather than or in addition to altering present func-
tional status. In many aspects of preventive care, for
example, the benefits of the treatment are evident only
many years after the intervention. A supportive family
that instills proper health habits in its children also
promotes better health in the future, even though the
benefit may not be realized for years. A person who is
very functional and asymptomatic today may harbor a
disease with a poor prognosis. For example, many indi-
viduals are at high risk of dying from heart disease
even though they are perfectly functional today. Should
we call them “healthy?” Comprehensive models that
combine morbidity, mortality, and prognosis have been
described in the literature [17], resulting in health out-
come measures that combines life expectancy with
quality of life and functioning. We prefer the concept
of the quality-adjusted life years (QALY), which offers
a general summary of population health outcome. The
primary advantages of the QALY are that it is generic,
and that it can be used as the measurable target of
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a population can be achieved by maximizing QALYs
within the constraints of the resources, as it can also
be achieved by other measures
1.
We recognize that different players have different
motivations for participating in health care. From our
perspective, the key to enhancing health is to focus on
maximizing health outcomes, rather than on expanding
units of delivered service [18], or investing almost exclu-
sively in medical care. Some services enhance health
outcomes, while others have little effect. Optimizing
population health may best be achieved by investing in
the combinations of activities that maximize health out-
comes. In later sections, we will talk about strategies to
improve outcome. But before we do, it is important to
understand the healthcare systems to be optimized, and
the imbalances that led to may of the current problems
and to the health opportunity cost dilemma.
The Healthcare Arena and Actors
To better understand the essentials of the healthcare
arena, and not be mired by its many complexities and
details, we consider how healthcare usage and financing
decisions are made and implemented in an extremely
simplified modeled environment. While many sociologi-
cal, political and organizational processes affect the
healthcare arena, we concentrate here on basic eco-
nomic processes which shape this environment. We
simplify the discussion by focusing on three major
groups of participants, or “actors”, that affect the intri-
cate healthcare arena (see Figure 2). There are many
players within each group, and they are often competing
with each other. Further, often participants may partici-
pate in several groups. Still, the similarities in interests,
objectives and resources among members of the same
group exceed the differences between the groups.
At the “receiving end” is the individual actor; this is
the current or future patient who does or will receive
health-related services, treatments and medications from
the healthcare system - the ultimate consumer of the
system’s services. Actually, this actor may be either a
single individual such as a patient seeing a physician, a
group of individuals like a family, or a community or
the public in the case of epidemics. The individual con-
sumer is the final determinant of the healthcare scope
and services, which eventually have to appease and fulfill
his or her, and the myriad of other individuals, expecta-
tions. The individual’s goal is to maintain or improve
his health status and outcomes, at a “reasonable” cost
[19,20]
The individual is the eventual payer for the healthcare
system services, in one or more ways: direct payout for
services; a (direct) health tax; through allocations from
public sources that are eventually financed by taxes’
paid directly by individuals or indirectly by other partici-
pants in the market; or through premiums paid by
Figure 2 The three actors in health. Note two way arrows between enterprise and government and government and individuals, but
one way arrow between enterprise and individuals (art original)
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For example, it is naïve to suggest that getting more
benefits paid by insurance companies reduces costs.
When companies are mandated to pay for a particular
service, these extra costs are usually reflected in higher
insurance premiums or in limitations of other services.
Employees who get richer health insurance packages
might unknowingly be accepting lower wages. As noted
by Fuchs [21], many maneuvers described as lowering
health care costs, are actually cost shifts that do not
reduce costs.
At the “supplier end” is the enterprise actor, who pro-
vides the various services to the individual. That actor
can be a direct supplier of health related services, such
as a medical provider of ambulatory or emergency
health services, a short stay hospital, or a long-term nur-
sing home. The enterprise can be a support and supply
e n t i t y ,s u c ha sal a b ,ad r u gc o m p a n y ,ad i s t r i b u t i n g
drug store, or a provider of preventive services and edu-
cation. The enterprise can be a financing or manage-
ment entity, which caters to t h eh e a l t h c a r ea r e n a ,s u c h
as a HMO, an insurance company, or another public or
private payer. An enterprise might also be an investor in
goods that affect health outcomes, such as education or
public facilities. The enterprise is often profit oriented,
though not for profit organizations are also included.
Enterprise decisions are most often influenced by eco-
nomic factors, but political, organizational, knowledge,
and other forces can also motivate enterprise actions.
The third actor is the government, the representative
of the people, whose goal should be to use available
public and private resources effectively and efficiently to
maximize population health status and outcomes. The
government is the policy maker and legislator that sets
the boundaries and playing field for the individuals and
enterprises; in this role it often strives to satisfy the
expectations of individuals and maintain fairness toward
and between enterprises, while also generating new
expectations. A non-government health authority could
also play this role. The government (or substitute health
authority) also fulfills the role of controller and auditor
which assures that the other actors “play according to
the rules”. It licenses providers, sets the boundaries for
their activities and audits them to assure that they fol-
low the legislations and rules. As the public advocate,
the government is best suited to provide a long-range
vision of public health and healthcare systems. It has
the power to direct and monitor population health, and
evaluate and execute - directly or indirectly - a wide
range of activities that might enhance population health
status.
On the other hand, the government has two other
roles closely related to the enterprise. It may have a
direct role as an enterprise, either as a direct provider of
healthcare services, or as a reimburser and payer for
medical services. In the U.S., the government owned VA
Health Systems is a direct provider of services, and the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS),
which operates plans like Medicare and Medicaid, reim-
burses providers for healthcare services. In this role
CMS determines the scope of services provided, and
affects the level of healthcare services through the
encouragement and discouragement of particular service
through regulations and direct payments to providers.
Other government agencies, like the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), promote and encourage
the profit orientation of the private enterprises, regard-
less of their impact and contribution to the population
health. Consequently, the government is often in a con-
flict of interests between its various roles.
The same model applies to many countries, and simi-
lar actors exist everywhere. The Ministry of Health in
Israel offers one example. This agency is responsible for
the implementation of the National Health Act and for
the regulation of the national health basket of treat-
ments and medications, and at the same time it is the
operator of about half the public hospitals. Other inter-
national examples are available [22]. At the same time,
the existence of a national health system tends to
emphasize the role of government. Where national
health systems do not exist, or where market emphasis
is evident as in the U.S., the enterprise has significant
power and role in the healthcare arena.
A significant driver of the healthcare environment and
health outcomes is the availability and control of health
related information, and the inherent balance between
the actors. The actions of individuals, as well as their
perception of a desirable health status and outcomes,
are driven by their expectations for health outcomes.
Due to lack of knowledge, these are often substituted
with expectations for health services, which are assumed
to be surrogates for health outcomes. These expecta-
tions are often set by the enterprise or the government,
either directly through related agencies or by the politi-
cal process. Government and enterprise have the infor-
mation, knowledge, aura of expertise, and resources to
gain attention for these issues. The individual and the
public function from a position of weakness, often with
minimal or partial information. The public may have
high expectations, which are significantly affected by the
enterprise and government, but the process of their ful-
fillment - and the resulting shaping of the healthcare
system - may be warped and convoluted.
The Healthcare Market Imbalance
This “triangle of actors” i s ,t oal a r g ee x t e n t ,a tt h e
source of the opportunity cost dilemma which is
reflected by the paradox of excess and deprivation. The
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market, which is driven to a large extent by the imbal-
ance of information and power between the actors. In
an efficient market the prices of services and assets
reflect information known to all the participants, are
unbiased and embody the collective beliefs about future
prospects. It is not possible to consistently outperform
an efficient market. But in the healthcare market the
individual has the least resources and has the least
knowledge, either due to the highly specialized and
complex nature of the medical and health information
and lack of education, or due to lack of access to
sources of information. The lack of sufficient resources
and information further hampers the individual, espe-
cially at times of need, since he often lacks the ability to
personally withstand the lengthy and costly treatments
faced in a time of crisis.
T h ee n t e r p r i s ea n dt h eg o v e r n m e n t ,o nt h eo t h e r
hand, hold most of the cards. They have the information
and expertise to understand and interpret it, and the
resources to use the information. Many enterprises have
vast resources, and especially the pharmaceutical com-
panies, insurers, and large healthcare organizations; this
is particularly evident in a free market western country
such as the U.S. More important, the enterprise plays a
double-role economically, by both generating the
demand for services and by providing the supply of ser-
vices to satisfy this demand. The demand is generated
through setting of medical standards, like the therapeu-
tic thresholds for common medical conditions; through
the determination of the most appropriate treatments
and medications for medical needs, as done by the phy-
sicians and the drug companies; and, mostly, by being
the only entity that determines the health status of indi-
viduals and thus their medical needs. In this regard, pro-
fessional societies have a major role, as they essentially
“capture” the guidelines process; of course, they also
have conflicts of interests. Kaplan and Ong [23], for
example, suggest that the medical enterprise has effec-
tively expanded their market by creating guidelines sug-
gesting that 97% of the adult population would need to
be under medical surveillance. The enterprise has incen-
tives and resources to keep their market share healthy.
The healthcare enterprise is the one determining how
medically needy individuals will be treated. Clearly, this
is a situation where the “cat is asked to safeguard the
cream”, where the enterprise would first of all maximize
its profits, while assuring that it is legally protected
against malpractice liability. The government, in its role
as the guide of the financial market, promotes this atti-
tude. Consequently, the enterprise tends to replace less
profitable treatments and services with more profitable
ones, use certain services excessively (e.g., as is the case
with hysterectomy and caesarean operations), add many
diagnostic services to protect against liability, or over-
perform diagnostic services just to protect itself from
malpractice suits. The powerful healthcare enterprise
has essentially no incentive to promote upstream pre-
vention efforts, or to divert resources to non-medical
approaches to enhance population health.
The healthcare enterprise also has the incentive and
extensive financial resources to perpetuate the demand
for its products and services, regardless of their impact
on the long-term population health. Just consider how
the amount and length of time needed for the develop-
ment of a new drug creates barriers to entry for new
entities to the drug development and manufacturing
business. The result is the continuity and power of the
existing pharmaceutical industry. At the same time,
these resources support an extensive lobbying activity
that protects the interests of the drug companies, and
ensure that medical providers use their drugs; both
activities further strengthen this sector. Similar observa-
tions can be made with regard to the large healthcare
organizations, the insurance companies, the societies of
medical professionals, and the other members of the
healthcare enterprise. Although enterprise may advocate
for competition, they also seek to control competition,
as evidenced by the assertive campaign against a public
option in U.S. healthcare reform.
One of the most significant problems for individual
consumers is the manipulation of their preferences by
direct to consumer advertising. Although the advertising
is alleged to provide consumer information, substantial
evidence suggests that these advertisements offer limited
information, are beyond the comprehension of many
consumers, and are designed to empower consumers to
request specific products by brand name. The result is
overselling of products that add to the excessive misuse
of the healthcare system, promotes and strengthen the
enterprise, and might conflict with the goal of promot-
ing population health [24].
The government also contributes to the imbalance of
the market. Like the healthcare enterprise, the govern-
ment has considerable amount of resources and infor-
mation - far beyond the resources and information
available to the individuals and the public. Through
directed and targeted release of this information, it
affects public expectations and legislative and control
activities. Using reimbursement to enterprise providers
for medical services, as in the UK’s NHS or the U.S.’s
Medicare system it maintains the status quo in the mar-
ket and assures continuance of current practices. The
government has, in addition to vast resources, consider-
able legislative and control power. Through enterprise-
like activity, such as Pay for Performance in the UK and
F e ef o rS e r v i c ea se m p l o y e db yt h eC M Si nt h eU . S . ,i t
influences the demand and supply in the market. At the
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as were evident in the dialog pursuant in the U.S.
healthcare reform, government decisions often are made
with insufficient pertinent information; this was also evi-
denced by some of the latest incidents regarding certifi-
cations of medications by formulary control authorities.
Allowing government to directly compete with the
enterprise as a provider of health services and payer of
health insurance, may further upset the balance in the
market, threaten enterprise providers, and reshape the
market. The introduction of the Massachusetts health
care reform law in 2006, which mandated that nearly
every resident of Massachusetts obtain a state-govern-
ment-regulated minimum level of healthcare insurance
coverage, completely changed the healthcare market in
Massachusetts. In Israel, the introduction of the
National Health Act at the end of 1994, and the result-
ing effective nationalization of the four Israeli sick
funds, created a government controlled healthcare sys-
tem, that only in the last several years have been pene-
trated in a significant share by the insurance companies
[25]. The level of government involvement was, and
continues to be, one of the major contended issues in
the U.S. healthcare reform that was enacted earlier this
year.
Consequences of the Imbalance
The consequences of this unhealthy imbalance between
the three actors include excess use of unnecessary ser-
vices and underuse of some valuable services. We
believe that these are a direct consequence of the imbal-
ance between enterprise and government, and the weak-
ness of the individual and the public; this is well
demonstrated by the move toward overtreatment of
blood pressure and cholesterol as discussed below. Yet,
healthcare reform in the U.S. will do little to control
this influence of enterprise.
Excess
Health services, as argued above, should improve popu-
lation health by extending life and improving quality of
life for the entire population. Excess services are activ-
ities that use resources without enhancing population
health, or services inappropriate for health needs. Excess
health services are closely related to disproportionate
distribution and use of healthcare resources. Those with
easy access to services tend to overuse them, or have
excessive services and medications offered to them by
providers and drug companies. On the other hand,
those with poor or missing health insurance tend to
minimize use of preventive and ambulatory day-to-day
resources, and excessively use publicly available, higher
cost services, such as emergency rooms at time of stress.
Demands on resources continue to grow. Aging and
chronic illnesses may be associated with a dispropor-
tionate share in the growth of healthcare costs. A series
of papers by Thorpe illustrate this point [26,27]. For
example, 75% of total healthcare spending in the US is
linked to chronically ill patients. Over the last twenty
years there have been substantial increases in the pro-
portion of the population treated for chronic conditions.
For example, the proportion of the population being
actively treated for high cholesterol jumped from 1.4%
of the population in 1987 to 10.7% in 2003 (an increase
of 664%). The number of adults treated for mental dis-
orders nearly tripled in this interval from 5.3% to 17.4%
[26]. Adjusted for inflation, the U.S. spends less on hos-
pital care than it did twenty years ago, but more than
twice as much for prescription drugs [23]. Figure 3
shows the changes is the use of common drugs over a
10 year period beginning in 1995-1996 and ending in
2003-2004. The data are based on visits to physicians
that are coded as drug visits. These are defined as out-
patient office or hospital outpatient department visits
during which at least one prescription or non-prescrip-
tion medication was recorded in the patient record.
They are presented in two-year blocks: 1995-1996 and
2003-2004. The raw numbers were divided by the sum
of the population estimates for both years in each block,
and divided by 100 to produce the number of drugs per
100 persons in the population.
Treatment of chronic illness has been attractive to
enterprise actors: medical providers and pharmaceutical
companies. Those with chronic disease have an ongoing
need for medications and for the regular use of medical
care. For most of these conditions, the cost of medica-
tion use significantly exceeds the cost of hospitalization
[27]. Between 1995-6 and 2003-4, prescriptions for peni-
cillin decreased by 21 percent. However, antidepressant
medication prescriptions increased by 118%, antiphyper-
tensive prescriptions increased by 293% and drugs for
high cholesterol increased by 339%! As those born after
the second World War reach retirement age with their
chronic illnesses, the percent of total healthcare costs
spent on prescription medications can be expected to
increase [28], with a resulting increase in the overall
healthcare costs.
Enterprise Forces that Expand Care
One of the most important mechanisms for promoting
the goals of the enterprise is through the use of evi-
dence-based guidelines, which have a substantial influ-
ence of the services that will be delivered. Though
supposedly founded on evidence-based reviews, the
guidelines often lead to inefficient use of resources.
Further, there are many different groups creating
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line committees remain common [29].
Peer developed guidelines legitimize much of contem-
porary healthcare. Treatment for the very high preva-
lence of chronic disease accounts for as much as two
thirds of healthcare spending [28]. It is not entirely clear
that this level of expenditure is appropriate. Over the
last few years, the diagnostic thresholds for several com-
mon medical conditions have been lowered, resulting in
a substantial expansion in the market for healthcare
[30,31]. For example, the majority of the older adult
population now meets the criteria for hypercholesterole-
mia and hypertensive disease as defined by the most
recent guidelines for high cholesterol [32] and high
blood pressure [33], and are, consequently, in need of
regular medical attention. In the last few years, propo-
sals have emerged to lower disease thresholds for these
and other conditions even further.
Consider blood pressure, for example. The number of
people affected would go from about 14% to about 40%
of the adult U.S. population if the new guidelines are
adopted. In other words, there would be a 185%
increase in the number of affected people with no
observable change in the status of the population [23].
The Joint National Committee on Prevention, Detec-
tion, Evaluation, and Treatment of High Blood Pressure,
in its JNC-7 report, created a new category known as
pre-hypertension; individuals previously categorized as
normal now qualify for this diagnosis [34]. The National
Cholesterol Education Program Adult Treatment Panel
III Guidelines (ATP-3) lowered the threshold for con-
cern about serum cholesterol [35]. A committee of the
American Diabetes Association lowered the threshold
for Impaired Fasting Glucose from 110 mg/dl to 100
mg/dl [36]. Analysis of the National Health and Nutri-
tion Examination survey shows that the change of defi-
nitions has profound effects on the number of people
who might be labeled as having these three risk factors:
cholesterol, blood pressure, and blood glucose. Kaplan
and Ong [23] explored the implications of changing the
definitions of Coronary Heart Disease (CHD) risk fac-
tors. Considering these three risk factors, more than
97% of the adult population would need to be under
medical surveillance. Kaplan and Ong [23] suggest that
the benefit of treatment for adults in the “pre-disease”
categories may be quite small. On the other hand, the
costs of the treatment are likely to be substantial. New
pharmacological approaches to the treatment of high
blood pressure are very expensive, costing several dol-
lars per day. For a 50 year old diagnosed with “pre-
hypertension,” the additional drug costs might exceed
$500 per year, and this cost would be repeated each
year for the remainder of that individual’sl i f e s p a n .I n
addition, there are substantial monitoring costs because
people taking medications need to visit their physicians
more often.
Figure 3 Change in Use of Selected Prescription and Non-Prescription Drugs between 1995-6 and 2003-4. Data from Health, United
States 2006 Data from table 92, pg. 332 (art original)
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Page 8 of 14It is worth noting that different groups that look at
the same data may decide on different guidelines. For
example, the European Society of Hypertension Task
Force recently backed away from the aggressive manage-
ment of low threshold hypertension, blood glucose, and
serum cholesterol [37,38].
Under Use of Potentially Valuable Services
At the same time that ineffective services are being
overused, many potentially valuable services are not
used enough. For example, systematic evidence suggests
that at the time of admission to the hospital for a heart
attack, and at the time of discharge, the administration
of beta blockers and aspirin can save lives. But, these
inexpensive and effective interventions are underutilized
[39].
Individuals also play a role in the overuse of health-
care, because of their motivation to stay well. People
who have higher anxiety about their own health and
insufficient information, may develop an affinity for
treatments, and especially if encouraged to do so
through drug promotion and advertising, as is common
in the U.S. Enterprise may have undue influence on
information and may control markets through the devel-
opment of guidelines and through advertising. Govern-
ment may yield to the persuasive position of the
enterprise and its political power. At the same time,
many principles that could have an important impact on
community health are overlooked, largely because they
do not have the right advocates.
Prevention is perhaps the best example reflecting mis-
alignment of incentives. There may be many ways to
prevent disease, but modern preventive medicine favors
screening tests such as mammography or the Prostate
Specific Antigen (PSA) test. However, screening is sec-
ondary rather than primaryp r e v e n t i o n ,b e c a u s ei t
detects a disease that has already been initiated. Much
of what we believe to be “early” detection is really detec-
tion of disease at a relatively advanced phase. Rando-
mized clinical trials suggest that the impact of cancer
screening on total mortality is quiet disappointing.
Although it seems counterintuitive, virtually all systema-
tic randomized clinical trials that consider total mortal-
ity fail to show that cancer screening extends the life
expectancy [40].
In 1993 McGinnis and Foege forced a reevaluation of
health risks by concentrating on the major non-genetic
contributors to mortality [41]. When these factors are
considered independent of the disease model, clear prio-
rities for prevention emerge. Tobacco use is associated
with more than 400,000 deaths each year, while diet and
physical activity patterns account for an additional
300,000. These dwarf the number of deaths associated
with problems that the public is generally concerned
about, such as illicit drug use. The McGinnis and Foege
analysis was replicated in the year 2000 by Mokdad and
colleagues [42]. The results of their analysis are shown
in Table 1. The updated analysis revealed the same rank
ordering of the actual causes of death. However, poor
diet and physical inactivity were gaining on tobacco use
as the leading actual cause of death.
In the previous section we cited several examples of
commonly used interventions that can be expected to
have minimal effects on health outcomes. Conversely,
other services that might have substantial population
impact are often less used. Enterprise, which is highly
invested in heath insurance coverage, focuses on treat-
ment for defined diagnoses. Typically, only a tiny por-
tion of the huge healthcare budget is devoted to
interventions aimed at the main causes of sickness and
mortality, most of which are behavioral. Estimates sug-
gest that less than 5% of the total annual healthcare
budget is devoted to prevention efforts (Rothenberg,
Masca, Mikl et al., 1987). Nearly all of this 5% is used
for secondary prevention, such as cancer screening tests.
Coffield and colleagues [43] reviewed the cost/effec-
tiveness of preventive services evaluated by the U.S. pre-
ventive services taskforce. Their analysis considered two
dimensions: the amount of disease burden relieved by
the service, and the cost/effectiveness of the interven-
tion. The highest impact service with the lowest rate of
delivery was tobacco cessation interventions for adults.
Less than 50% of adults who could benefit from this
intervention actually receive it. Other underutilized
effective services were screening for undetected vision
impairments, and substance (including tobacco) preven-
tion programs for adolescents. In order to determine
how best to use scarce healthcare resources, we need to
analyze the benefits and outcomes of health related
interventions in relation to the resources they require
[44]. Enterprise has little interest in promoting these
potentially effective services, and individuals lack the
understanding of how they can effectively enact behavior
change. Government, although clearly supportive of pri-
mary prevention, lacks the public health infrastructure
or the incentive and resources to successfully implement
primary prevention programs.
The Healthcare Pareto Efficiency
How does the economic balance, or rather the imbal-
ance, between the three groups of actors lead to the
healthcare market inefficiency? Can this balance be
shifted to reduce or eliminate the opportunity cost
dilemma? To this end, we consider whether the market
is Pareto efficient or optimal [45], using the concept of
Pareto frontier (Figure 4); this will be later used to ana-
lyze the U.S. healthcare arena.
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Page 9 of 14Each actor has a set of resources that he can allocate
according to his utility. These include supplies such as
drugs and hospital beds; activities such as treatments
and training; resources for improved health such as phy-
sician visits and lab tests; or time and money that a
patient can allocate to health related activities. The
resources need not be all monetary or monetary equiva-
l e n t ;i n f o r m a t i o n ,f o re x a m p l e ,i sah a r dt oq u a n t i f y
resource, yet it substantially affects the outcomes of the
system. The actors allocate their resources to achieve a
joint outcome. The utility of each actor determines the
value of the outcome to this actor, leading to a prefer-
ence order of allocations for the actor; the higher the
utility, the more preferred the outcome. Different actors
may have different utility functions, and thus different
preferred order for the outcomes. For example: the
patient may place a higher value on his health, and par-
ticularly with regard to severe ailments, while the drug
company may value more its market share or its profits.
A particular allocation of resources by an actor
reflects his utility and use of resources at the time of
allocation. At each point in time the set of allocations
by all the actors determines the position of the market
and the outcome for each actor. When a move from
one allocation to another can improve the outcome for
at least one actor, without harming other actors, it is a
Pareto improvement. When the outcome of an alloca-
tion cannot be improved by any Pareto improvement
allocations, it is a Pareto efficient allocation. The set of
all Pareto efficient allocations is the Pareto frontier.
Point A in Figure 4 demonstrates a position on the Par-
eto frontier for actor II, for example, the position of the
drug companies in the healthcare system. Note that
while a system may be Pareto efficient, it may function
in a “local optimum"; i.e., there may be another Pareto
efficient allocation which may be preferable, at least for
some of the actors (as demonstrated by point B in Fig-
u r e4 ) ,b u ti tm a yn o tb er e a c h a b l et h r o u g h( l o c a l )P a r -
eto improvement allocation movements. It is also worth
noting that Pareto efficiency does not require an equita-
ble distribution of wealth; the system may be Pareto effi-
cient even if a small minority has the vast majority of
the resources (as is the case with the drug companies in
the U.S.), or benefits from a much higher level of its uti-
lity than the other actors.
One should distinguish between the utilities of the
individual actors, and the “combined utility” of the
whole market. The combined utility is a weighted com-
bination of the individual utilities, but its optimal value
(for the whole market) may be reached in a position
that does not maximize the utilities of one or more of
the actors. The allocation of the healthcare system to
achieve the highest population health status and out-
comes, for example, may result in reduced profits (at
least for the short run) of some of the health
enterprises.
Discussion
If a system is not on the Pareto frontier, then it is not
Pareto efficient and thus, in principle at least, there is a
potential for Pareto improvement. For example: in Fig-
ure 4, point C is not on the Pareto frontier, as both
actors may gain (or at least not experience a decrease in
their utility) by moving to points A or B, or to any
point on the Pareto frontier between A and B. In reality,
though, even such a Pareto improvement may require
compensation or forced choice for one or more of the
actors; this may be due to the aversion to change of
many organizations, and to the short-term costs of a
change.
When the system is on the Pareto frontier, the actors
- as a group - have no incentive to deviate from the sta-
tus quo, and the resulting problems or inequities cur-
rently existing in the market. Indeed, a system wherein
strong actors take goods from the weak, as is the case
with the healthcare U.S. system, may be Pareto efficient
[46]. In other words: the current healthcare arena may
be riddled with issues and problems, but it is still hard
to change because it remains in a (relatively) stable posi-
tion. The outcomes of the U.S. health reform demon-
strate this; the relative positions of the public,
enterprise, and government, and the mechanisms gov-
erning the functions of the market, may not substan-
tially change as a result of the reform. Furthermore, it
can be argued that it is essentially impossible to gener-
ate, with the existing actors and preferences, a globally
accepted utility, which aggregates the preferences of the
Actor II 
Utility
(U2)
Pareto Frontier Pareto Frontier
A
C B
Actor I Utility (U1)
C not on Pareto Frontier, since C can be improved to A or B
since U1(A) > U1(C) and U1(B) > U1(C)
and    U2(A) > U2(C) and U2(B) > U2(C)
A and B on Pareto Frontier: improvement for one harms second
i U1(B) U1(A) b U2(B) U1(A)
A
C B
since U1(B) > U1(A) but U2(B) < U1(A)
and    U2(A) > U2(B) but U1(A) < U1(B)
Figure 4 Exanmple of Pareto frontier.
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Page 10 of 14various actors into market preferences, while keeping
their preference order, so as to achieve a market-wide
acceptable and stable position
2.
At the same time, as noted above, change over the
Pareto frontier can be achieved, but only at a cost to
one or more actors. For example, the U.S. healthcare
reform offers the opportunity for basic healthcare insur-
ance to many who are currently uninsured, and thus
reduce the high costs that result from their current use
of emergency services. But this will reduce the hospitals
income from emergency service (e.g., through Medicare
Disproportionate Share (DSH) payments and other
reclaiming programs). Consequently, only the passage of
a major legislation, such as the U.S. Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, could force such a move.
Note, however, that this will result in a larger efficiency
of the system, increased numbers of insured (and thus
premium paying) customers, and reduced emergency
services costs; thus, it is expected to improve the overall
economy of the healthcare system and its participants.
Another mechanism for a change in the allocations is
a change in the utility functions of the actors. Such a
change eventually leads to a new Pareto frontier, thus
enabling Pareto movement to the new frontier. For
example: a change in the utility of Actor II in Figure 5
shifts the original Pareto frontier upward into the modi-
fied Pareto frontier. This shift provides opportunity of a
s h i f tf r o mt h e“A” and “B” equilibrium points on the
original Pareto frontier to any point on the “A1” to “B1”
curved sections on the modified Pareto frontier. Because
much of the positioning of the actors in the healthcare
market is due to public expectations, change in these
expectations may lead to changes in the utilities and
thus to a change in the Pareto frontier. The change in
the attitude toward obesity, for example, is responsible
for major shifts in the positioning of various treatments,
diets, medications and behaviors.
Certain actors have more power to affect the market.
The medical profession affects the demand for medical
and health-related services, through the rejection of cer-
tain treatments or by a change in the thresholds for
treating disease. The enterprise affects the market
through advertising and products promotions. The gov-
ernment affects the market through legislation, certifica-
tion, customer education, modified Medicare and
Medicaid payment schedules, and changes in supporting
services such a mental health treatment.
The healthcare system is characterized by a short-term
perspective. The government has essentially an election-
to-election planning horizon, and the enterprises are
mostly driven by short-term financial and profit objec-
tive. A longer-term enterprise perspective should con-
sider healthcare strategy and investment to be a Socially
Responsible Investment
3, especially as related to the
social, ethical, and corporate governance. In the U.S. the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA) created, with a long-term perspective,
strict rules for the protection of individually identifiable
health information. HIPAA took major steps toward
social responsibility by recognizing the rights of patients
and forcing significant changes in the enterprise proce-
dures, data management, and activities. The Sarbane-
Oxley Act, created by the U.S. Congress in 2002, was
deigned to protect investors from corporate accounting
fraud. This helped boost corporate responsibility and
transparency. Standards such as International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS), Basel II and Solvency II,
and their related regulations, considerably change the
long-term accounting and business environment, with
the objective of establishing more stable, secure and
transparent markets. If the major government and enter-
prise players will adopt a long-term healthcare perspec-
tive, they may recognize that improving population
health is, in the long-run, a winning strategy that can
pay back more than the short-term profit maximization
approach currently used.
This brings us back to our premise - that healthcare
resources should buy the most health for the most peo-
ple. This is, in effect, the individual and public actor
long-term utility, though not the apparent enterprise
actor utility. We argue that if the government is indeed
to fulfill its constitutional responsibility as the public
advocate and provide for the general societal welfare, it
should adopt the same utility and a long-term perspec-
tive. The government has both the information required
for this task, as well as the legislative and financial
means to act. In principle, the government recognizes
Actor II 
Utility
(U2)
Original Pareto Frontier
Modified Pareto Frontier
"A1" Original Pareto Frontier
A
C B
Modified Pareto Frontier
"B1"
curve
"A1"
curve
Actor I Utility (U1)
A change in Actor II utility moves up the Pareto Frontier,
from the original one to the (dashed) modified one.
This enable a move from A to any point in the "A1" curve, 
and a move from B to any point in the "B1" curve.
Th i h i i f b h A l di
A
C B
Modified Pareto Frontier
"B1"
curve
"A1"
curve
These moves improve the position of both Actors, leading to
a new equilibrium point for the system.
Figure 5 Example of change in Utilities.
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Page 11 of 14this responsibility; however, the interpretation of “gen-
eral welfare” is fraught with ideological and political
overtones, and particularly so in the U.S. The starkest
example is the issue of a national health program that
provides services to all residents. Many countries, such
as the U.K. and other western countries, have adopted
national health systems, or a combination of a national
health system in cooperation with private market enter-
prises. The U.S., on the other hand, values a capitalistic
system wherein the means of production and services
are mostly privately owned and operated for profit, and
the economic means are distributed through the opera-
tion of a market economy; these, of course, contradict a
health system in which a central authority determines
the distribution of healthcare resources and outcomes.
In this U.S. system, societal objectives tend to be
ignored by the enterprise which provides the services,
and thus without governmental intervention the objec-
tive of buying most health for most people is ignored.
Indeed, it took more than four decades to achieve even
a modest health reform in the U.S., and only one state
(Massachusetts) has a healthcare system that resembles
a “national” health environment.
The very fact of a relatively stable U.S. healthcare mar-
ket implies a Pareto efficient status, and thus little pro-
spect for an un-enforced change. Indeed, it required a
major political drive by President Obama and the Demo-
cratic Party, fuelled by strong public demand, for a health
reform to be passed in the U.S. in 2009-2010, which
modifies various aspects of the existing U.S. healthcare
system The new reform package will create insurance
exchanges that increase consumer purchasing power, and
tax incentives for employers to offer insurance. The pro-
gram will forbid the denial of insurance to those with
pre-existing health conditions, and will mandate the pur-
chase of insurance by most citizens. Consequently, gov-
ernment will play a stronger role in regulating the
interface between enterprise and individuals.
Summary
Due to the relative weakness of the individual/public
actor, and the strong position of the government in its
role as the representative of the public, it is clear that
major changes will occur only when the individual and
public actors will work together. We believe these two
actors can become better aligned, as was partially done
under the U.S. Patient Protection Affordable Care Act.
To strengthen the individual/public sector, there is a
need for improved information. A clear campaign is
required to improve access to information, improve
transparency, educate the public, provide reliable
sources of information, regulate the extent and accuracy
of advertising claims, and respond to questions and
requests for information. This may require an
information revolution similar to the privacy and patient
rights revolution of the last decade. One step in this
direction is the rapid deployment of a global Medical
Health Record, which will enable sharing of information
when needed between all the health actors. The record
will improve the knowledge available to healthcare pro-
viders, and thus prevent errors, cut costs of duplicate
services and excessive testing, and support better health-
care services. At the same time, it may expose personal
medical information to a wider audience, and thus is
fraught with many social and legal issues.
Greater involvement of patients in decision-making
should be a priority. Patients make good decisions when
they have good information. Often this requires clearer
information about the risks of treatments and the recog-
nition that foregoing treatment may be an option. To
help patients become more involved in decision making
about their own care, the use of shared medical deci-
sion-making and decision aides should be expanded
[47-49], and programs such as Medicare and Medicaid
should pay providers for the extra time required to deli-
ver these services.
The healthcare enterprise offers medical and surgical
treatments that can have dramatic benefits [15]. How-
ever, there are cases in which treatments have relatively
little effect on health outcomes and may consume
resources without offering sufficient benefit [50]. When
too many dollars are used in pursuit of treatments with
lower value, less is available to purchase services that
are truly necessary. Sometimes overuse of services may
be stimulated by direct-to-consumer advertising cam-
paigns. Direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceuti-
cal products is only allowed in two countries, the
United States and New Zealand, and there is legal pre-
cedent for control over this “commercial speech”.F e d -
eral agencies should require balanced presentations of
costs, risks, and benefits, in a language and format
understandable by the average consumer.
The information available to decision makers, the gov-
ernment, and the public must improve. While technol-
ogy enables us to access enormous amount of data
today, restrictions of privacy, data ownership, and (often
antiquated) laws and traditions prevent efficient use of
this data, and its conversion to useful information. We
are also lacking objective experts and models that can
effectively use this data and distribute the resulting
information. Some action steps that should be consid-
ered include:
￿ Improve and enhance the transparency require-
ments for all parties, whether private or governmen-
tal. In addition to full disclosure, the information
should be presented in a way that can be understood
and absorbed by the public.
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Page 12 of 14￿ Evidence-based guidelines developed by impartial
groups should be required to consider both costs
and opportunity costs. An impartial governmental
agency should regulate the guideline process.
￿ Although conflicts of interest are now disclosed for
most independently promulgated guidelines, the ana-
l y s e ss h o u l dr e p o r tw h oi sl i k e l yt ob e n e f i ta n dw h o
will bear the costs, as well as the relations of the
guidelines setters with those who will benefit.
￿ Guidelines should improve transparency by report-
ing both the absolute and the relative risk outcomes
for people at varying levels on initial risk. Compli-
ance with the guidelines will affect the likely increase
in market size for pharmaceutical products and
healthcare services.
The government and public agencies must lead these
efforts; this, of course, requires political will and contin-
uous public pressure. Although difficult, we believe
these goals are attainable.
Limitations
It is important to recognize that healthcare decisions are
the product of a wide variety of influences including cul-
tural, historical, political, economical, legal and profes-
sional factors. The analysis offered here is simplified to
highlight and draw the contrast between just three
major actors, and describe the forces that shape the cur-
rent equilibrium. There are also important influences at
the public policy, social environmental, and the indivi-
dual decision maker levels. Thus we encourage further
analysis that builds more complex models and considers
the many nuances that will be required to advance pol-
icy shaping and change.
Endnotes
1 A sn o t e db yo n eo ft h er e v i e w e r s ,t h e r ei sas u f f i c i e n t
evidence of the weaknesses of QALY in capturing
important aspects of value, and that - as well as the lack
of consensus over goals - led to the development of pro-
cess-based decision-making frameworks. We do not pro-
mote QALY as the sole, or prominent, measure; rather,
we use it to demonstrate that such health measures
exist.
2 The situation in the healthcare market can be inter-
preted as a “voting” for resources. For voting systems, it
is said that “the only non-flawed voting system is a dic-
tatorship” (in the healthcare arena - by the enterprise
and government actors), as a result of Arrow’s Impossi-
bility Theorem. See, e.g., Why Flip a Coin? The Art and
Science of Good Decisions by H.W. Lewis, Wiley, 1997,
ISBN 0-471-29645-7.
3 See. E.g., the European Social Investment Forum,
(http://www.eurosif.org) or the Social Investment Forum
(http://www.socialinvest.org), and their publications.
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